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Abstract—An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) aims to alert
users of incoming attacks by deploying a detector that monitors
network traffic continuously. As an effort to increase detec-
tion capabilities, a set of independent IDS detectors typically
work collaboratively to build intelligence of holistic network
representation, which is referred to as Collaborative Intrusion
Detection System (CIDS). However, developing an effective CIDS,
particularly for the IoT ecosystem raises several challenges.
Recent trends and advances in blockchain technology, which
provides assurance in distributed trust and secure immutable
storage, may contribute towards the design of effective CIDS.
In this poster abstract, we present our ongoing work on a
decentralized CIDS for IoT, which is based on blockchain
technology. We propose an architecture that provides accountable
trust establishment, which promotes incentives and penalties,
and scalable intrusion information storage by exchanging bloom
filters. We are currently implementing a proof-of-concept of
our modular architecture in a local test-bed and evaluate its
effectiveness in detecting common attacks in IoT networks and
the associated overhead.
Index Terms—blockchain, IoT, intrusion detection system,
collaborative, scalability, trust management
I. INTRODUCTION
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is deployed as an in-
dispensable defense mechanism, which comprised of monitors
across the network, to identify and alert users about incom-
ing attacks. Generally, a monitor identifies incoming threats
either by matching observed events with known signature of
intrusions (signature-based) or by finding deviations in current
network traffic conditions and regular conditions by means of
machine learning techniques (anomaly-based). Sensed threats
are reported to the user as security alarms.
The prevalence of IoT implementation across diverse areas
has expanded the attack surface and raised more security con-
cerns, especially in protecting devices from various threats [1].
To improve the accuracy of threat detection, researchers pro-
posed combination of individual IDSs to work in a collabo-
rative fashion, referred as Collaborative-IDS (CIDS). In this
scheme, a set of independent IDS monitors are encouraged
to exchange intrusion information, e.g., alarms and attack
signatures, resulting in a holistic representation of the recent
network conditions.
While CIDS enhances the security, several inherent chal-
lenges of designing CIDS for IoT remain unsolved. First,
IDS nodes need to trust one another to collaboratively ex-
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Fig. 1. Architecture of proposed decentralized CIDS.
change intrusion related information, especially if monitors
are under the control of different owners. There is a need
for fair and transparent trust mechanisms that encourage
incentives for trustworthy contributions and impose penalties
for fraudulent manipulations. Second, there is a need to design
scalable mechanisms for storing a large amount of detection
information that the individual IDS’s within a CIDS may
generate. Third, the design of CIDS should also consider
unique characteristics of the IoT network, such as the highly
dynamic network architecture and the constrained nature of
IoT nodes.
Recent research in blockchain-based technologies has
shown its applicability in diverse domains, which solves
challenges of decentralization of trust and reliable data storage
in parallel and distributed systems. The decentralized nature
of blockchain, that replaces centralized processing with secure
collaborative processing, is a good fit for solving the inherent
challenges in CIDS. Several works have proposed blockchain-
based CIDS, including anomaly-based [2] and signature-
based [3] approaches, which essentially aim to progressively
build trusted anomaly models and signature databases stored
securely in blockchains. However, these works overlooked the
aforementioned challenges, such as accountable trust estab-
lishment and scalability.
In this poster abstract, we present our ongoing work on
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decentralized CIDS for IoT. Our blockchain-based design i)
establishes distributed trust between participants, with trans-
parent and accountable mechanisms that incentivize decent
contributions, ii) allows compact representation of detection
related information by exchanging bloom filters, which im-
proves scalability, and iii) enables secure and efficient storage
of the detection models and signature database by dividing
meta-data and detection models to different storage media.
We outline our architectural design in Fig. 1.
II. ONGOING WORK
We describe our ongoing work with regard to the architec-
ture design and the evaluation strategy.
A. Architecture Design
As depicted in Fig. 1, our architecture consists of four
interconnected layers, namely application, storage, trust man-
agement, and blockchain layers. The application layer is
comprised of an IDS module which trains and runs detection
models and collects intrusion signatures, while also running
a lightweight blockchain node. Our anomaly-based detection
utilizes a lightweight supervised SVM model [4], while the
signature-based detection works by matching observed events
with the intrusion signatures. The trust management layer con-
sists of smart contracts, which are executed on the blockchain
to provide transparent incentive and penalty mechanisms for
positive and negative contributions. The storage layer stores
the supervised detection models and intrusion signatures in a
peer-to-peer hypermedia protocol, IPFS1, while the underlying
blockchain layer acts as a trusted meta-data storage and
consensus platform. We separate the data storage to prevent
blockchain size from becoming too large. To link meta-data
and the detection model, we store the hash of each model
securely in the blockchain.
An intrusion detection module, which is deployed in each
IDS node, interacts with blockchain’s smart contract to col-
laboratively contribute a new detection model or to obtain
newly published models from other peers. In each interaction,
the corresponding smart contract assesses the contribution
of the IDS node. To avoid an adversary from contribut-
ing deceptive detection models, i.e., adversarial attack, the
consensus algorithm inspects each contribution for malicious
models and exclude the corresponding models from being
appended into the blockchain. When an IDS node needs to
acquire a new detection model, the IDS node collects the
model from the storage layer. To notify all peers in case of a
detected intrusion, a blockchain event will be triggered. This
way, the blockchain event disseminates intrusion alarms to
all participating IDS nodes. In our architecture, IDS nodes
are placed in gateways, as the IDS nodes are required to
perform asymmetric cryptography and machine learning oper-
ations, and may need relatively large storage for hosting the
blockchain and detection models.
1https://ipfs.io
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Fig. 2. Evaluation scenario.
B. Evaluation
We are currently implementing a proof-of-concept of our
proposed architecture in a local test-bed that simulates real-
world IoT deployment, based on the Ethereum blockchain.
We show our proof-of-concept design in Fig. 2. Our proof-of-
concept consists of four interconnected components, namely
IoT networks, an Ethereum full node, an IPFS local cluster,
and an attacker simulating incoming attacks. An IoT network
of Raspberry Pis running an Ethereum light client and Python
based supervised learning modules is implemented as the ap-
plication layer, which is responsible for detecting and alerting
intrusions. We provide a cluster of local IPFS network to store
the detection model and datasets, while another instance of
Ethereum full node stores the entire blockchain ledger.
For performance evaluation, we are evaluating the effec-
tiveness of our design by penetrating the network with com-
mon attacks in IoT network [5], such as denial of service
(DoS), man-in-the-middle or spoofing, reconnaissance, and
replay attacks. We also investigate the associated overhead
of blockchain utilization in the architecture compared with
conventional CIDS mechanisms.
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